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Abstract 
This Summary Report presents the results of a comprehensive study (Volkanovski et al., 
2015) on Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and Station Blackout (SBO) events registered in 
IRSN (Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire), GRS (Gesellschaft für 
Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit mbH) in time period 1992 to 2011 and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) Licensee Event Reports (LERs) database and the IAEA 
International Reporting System (IRS) in the time period 1990 to 2013. 
The events were classified considering predefined categories. An analysis of the 
distribution of the identified events within the categories and type of plant operational 
modes was performed. 
The LOOP frequency was determined for each database and four LOOP event categories: 
plant centered, switchyard centered, grid related and weather related. The obtained 
frequencies obtained for critical and shutdown operations are presented.  
Based on the observations of the identified LOOP events, the activities that may result in 
reduction of the number of LOOP events and minimize consequences on plant safety are 
enlisted. 
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1 Introduction 
The fundamental safety objective, as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA, 2006) is to protect people and the environment from the harmful effects of the 
ionizing radiation. The prime purpose of the nuclear safety is prevention of the release of 
radioactive materials formed in the nuclear fuel, ensuring that the operation of nuclear 
power plants does not contribute significantly to the individual and societal risk. 
The nuclear safety is fulfilled in the nuclear power plants with provision, in all situations, 
of the basic safety functions (IAEA, 2012): 
- Control of reactivity 
- Removal of decay heat to the ultimate heat sink 
- Containment of radioactive materials 
The basic safety functions shall be assured either by inherent safety features relying on 
the laws of nature (IAEA, 2009) or reliable active safety systems designated for 
realization of these functions. The operating nuclear power plants have safety systems 
that are in general active requiring electrical energy for their activation and operation.  
The loss of offsite power (LOOP) initiating event occurs when all electrical power to the 
plant from offsite power system is lost.  
The electrical power after the LOOP is expected to be provided either by the plant 
generator or, in case of unsuccessful decrease of output power to house load, by the 
emergency diesel generators (EDG). 
Loss of alternating current (AC) to the essential and nonessential switchgear buses in a 
NPP (i.e., loss of off-site electric power system concurrent with turbine trip and 
unavailability of the on-site emergency AC power system) is referred to as station 
blackout (SBO).  
This Summary Report presents the main results of the analysis of LOOP events identified 
in four databases elaborated extensively in the Topical Study (Volkanovski et al., 2015). 
The description of the database screening methodology and events classification is given 
in Section 2. The results of the analysis of identified events are given in Section 3. Main 
observations based on the identified events are listed in Section 4. The conclusions are 
given in Section 5. 
2 Events identification and classification methodology 
Identification of the relevant LOOP events in the analysed databases was done in two 
steps:  
- First the databases were searched to identify potential events for consideration. 
- Search results were reviewed with selection and classification of the relevant events. 
Database searching was done with relevant “guidewords” and "keywords" identified in 
relation with the “LOOP and SBO” topic. All identified events in the search of the 
databases were carefully analysed. The relevant events were selected and classified 
based on predefined criteria. The methodology for events screening and selection was 
also applied to the analysis of the EDG failures (Kančev et al., 2014). 
The database SAPIDE, owned and managed by IRSN, and the database VERA, owned 
and managed by GRS, were screened for relevant events reported for the period from 
01/01/1992 to 31/12/2011.  
The US NRC LERs database and IAEA Incident Reporting System (IRS) (IAEA, 2010) 
database were searched to identify representative LOOP related events for the period 
1990-2013 with utilization of the available databases search tools and relevant 
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keywords. The widespread grid disturbance which happened on August 14, 2003, 
affected nine NPPs sites with eleven reactors, was taken into account. Five of those 
events were selected and considered further in the analysis. 
The selected LOOP events were classified into categories considering the following 
factors: plant status, circumstances, type of event, type of equipment failed, direct and 
root cause, consequences of the event and event duration.  Each event was classified 
into single best matching category with the exception for the characteristic related to the 
type of equipment failed and the consequences, which can be multiple. 
3 Analysis of identified events 
Table 1 shows the number of events identified in the analysed databases for different 
plant status.  
Table 1: Number of selected events for different plant status and database  
 Number of events 
Database source FRANCE GERMANY USNRC IAEA IRS 
PLANT STATUS 
On power 145 102 76 47 
Hot Shutdown 25 12 7 0 
Cold Shutdown 58 76 37 5 
 
Table 1 shows that largest number of LOOP events are registered during power 
operation followed by cold shutdown. 
The LOOP events are subdivided into four types by cause or location: plant centered, 
switchyard centered, grid related, and weather related. These four LOOP categories are 
assessed for two modes of operation (critical and shutdown operation). The 
categorization of the LOOP events is based on the categorization and description of the 
LOOP categories given in the document NUREG/CR 6890 (NRC, 2005).  
The assessment of the LOOP frequency requires as input the total reactor critical or 
shutdown years for the analyzed data period. The total reactor critical and shutdown 
years for the analyzed countries and databases are assessed from the number of the 
operating NPPs and their operating factor (OF) representing the ratio of on-line hours to 
total hours. The number of the operating reactors is assessed from (IAEA, 2015a). The 
average operating factor of the reactors in each year is determined from the Country 
Nuclear Power Profiles given in IAEA Power Reactor Information System (IAEA, 2015b). 
3.1 Obtained LOOP frequencies 
Obtained LOOP frequencies for the analysed databases are given in Table 2 to Table 4. 
The first column of the tables defines the plant operational mode (critical/shutdown) with 
LOOP categories given in the second column. The number of identified events for each 
category and mode is given in third column. The mean frequency of the LOOP events per 
reactor critical (rcry) or shutdown year (rsy) is given in the fourth column. The LOOP 
frequency is obtained by dividing the number of the identified events by the reactor 
critical and shutdown years. 
The LOOP frequencies obtained for the French and German NPPs during critical 
operation, as shown in Table 2 and Table 3, are of same order of magnitude. The 
frequency of the LOOP events is twice larger for German plants compared to the French 
NPPs. Table 2 and Table 3 show that plant related events are the dominant contributors 
to the events in the IRSN and GRS databases. 
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Table 2: Plant-level LOOP frequencies assessed from IRSN database 
Mode 
LOOP 
category 
No. of 
Events 
Mean 
frequency 
Frequency 
Units 
Critical operation plant 110 1.23E-1 /rcry 
  switchyard 26 2.90E-2 /rcry 
  grid 3 3.35E-3 /rcry 
  weather 6 6.70E-3 /rcry 
  All 145 1.62E-1 /rcry 
Shutdown operation plant 71 3.00E-1 /rsy 
  switchyard 11 4.65E-2 /rsy 
  grid 1 4.23E-3 /rsy 
  weather 0 0 /rsy 
  All 83 3.51E-1 /rsy 
 
Table 3: Plant-level LOOP frequencies assessed from GRS database 
Mode 
LOOP 
category 
No. of 
Events 
Mean 
frequency 
Frequency 
Units 
Critical operation plant 81 2.93E-1 /rcry 
  switchyard 2 7.23E-3 /rcry 
  grid 16 5.78E-2 /rcry 
  weather 3 1.08E-2 /rcry 
  All 102 3.69E-1 /rcry 
Shutdown operation plant 75 9.22E-1 /rsy 
  switchyard 1 1.23E-2 /rsy 
  grid 9 1.11E-1 /rsy 
  weather 3 3.69E-2 /rsy 
  All 88 1.08 /rsy 
 
Table 4: Plant-level LOOP frequencies assessed from US NRC database 
Mode 
LOOP 
category 
No. of 
Events 
Mean 
frequency 
Frequency 
Units 
Critical operation plant 14 6.73E-3 /rcry 
  switchyard 42 2.02E-2 /rcry 
  grid 7 3.37E-3 /rcry 
  weather 12 5.77E-3 /rcry 
  All 75 3.61E-2 /rcry 
Shutdown operation plant 13 2.61E-2 /rsy 
  switchyard 23 4.62E-2 /rsy 
  grid 4 8.03E-3 /rsy 
  weather 5 1.00E-2 /rsy 
  All 45 9.03E-2 /rsy 
  
  
 
8
The difference of the assessed LOOP frequencies between the French and German NPP's 
is even larger for shutdown operations. A frequency of at least one LOOP per shutdown 
year is obtained for German nuclear power plants. 
A value of 3.61E-2 /rcry is calculated for LOOP frequency during critical operation for the 
US NPPs, as indicated in Table 4, which is comparable to the 3.59E-2 /rcry assessed in 
NUREG/CR-6890 (NRC, 2005). The LOOP frequencies for shutdown operations listed in 
Table 4 are smaller than the frequencies assessed in (NRC, 2005). 
Table 1 shows that very few LOOP events are reported in IAEA IRS and therefore not 
considered as representative for LOOP frequency assessment. 
3.2 Plant status 
The largest number of LOOP events in IRSN SAPIDE is registered for the plant centered 
events, followed by the switchyard centered events. The 64 % of the events are 
registered during the critical operation mode followed by cold and hot shutdown events. 
The plant centered events are identified with the largest number in the GRS VERA 
database. The distribution of the events considering plant status shows that 40 % of all 
events in the GRS VERA database are registered during cold shutdown. This is an 
expected result considering the extensive time of the German NPPs in cold shutdown in 
the analysed period. 
Figure 1 shows that the largest number of events in U.S. NRC LERs database is 
registered for the switchyard related events contributing to 54 % of all registered 
events. Plant-centered LOOPs is the second largest group with 23% followed with 
weather related events with 14% and grid related events with 9% of all registered 
events. The identified share of plant and weather related events is identical to the shares 
identified in the report (NRC, 2005), with comparable shares for grid and weather 
events. 
  
Figure 1: LOOP events distribution by category "Plant status" (U.S. NRC LERs) 
Figure 1 show that largest percentage of the events with 62% is registered during the 
critical operation followed by 31% during cold shutdown and 7% during hot shutdown 
operation. 
The 90% of the events in the IAEA IRS database are registered during critical operation 
with 10% during cold shutdown.  
The results obtained show that the largest numbers of events are reported for plant 
centered category in the three databases (SAPIDE, VERA, IAEA-IRS). The largest 
number of the events in the NRC-LER database is identified for switchyard centered 
events. The largest percentage of the events, considering the mode of operation, is 
registered during critical operation in all the four databases. 
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3.3 Circumstances 
Figure 2 shows that the largest number of events in IRSN SAPIDE is registered during 
normal operation contributing to 36 % of all events. Inspection is second largest with 
24%, while functional tests and maintenance are contributing 16% of all events. The 
contribution of the remaining circumstances, as shown on Figure 2, is small. 
 
Figure 2: LOOP events counts by "Circumstances" (IRSN SAPIDE) 
 
The largest number of LOOP events in GRS VERA is registered during inspection and 
functional tests, followed by normal operation and maintenance activities. The obtained 
result was expected considering the shutdown operation mode of the German NPPs in 
the analysed period.  
In U.S. NRC LERs the largest number of events is registered during normal critical 
operation, followed by maintenance activities and inspection functional test. 
The largest number of events registered in the IAEA IRS database is registered during 
normal operation with small contribution of other circumstances. The final conclusion 
from the analysis of all four databases is that the major part of the LOOP events is 
registered during normal operation of the plant. 
3.4 Type of event 
The largest number (114 in total) of LOOP events in IRSN SAPIDE is registered for the 
type "Partial loss of external power" during critical operation. Physical damage of buses, 
are more severe for nuclear safety. Four events of physical damage of buses are 
registered in the French database and three of them during cold shutdown operation. 
In the GRS VERA database the largest number (53 in total) of events are observed for 
the type "Physical loss of electrical busbars. All events "Loss of power supply" in GRS 
VERA are registered during cold shutdown mode. 
The largest number (29) of events in U.S. NRC LERs is registered for "Partial loss of 
external power" events. Smaller but comparable number (26) of events is registered for 
the "Total loss of external power" events. The largest number of those events in U.S. 
NRC LERs is registered during critical mode of operation. 
The "Loss of power to busbars" events have largest number (19) followed by total (17) 
and partial loss (10) of external power in IAEA IRS. The major number of events is 
identified during the critical operation mode.  
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From the analysis in this section it can be concluded that the largest number of "Partial 
loss of external power" events is registered in the IRSN and NRC databases. In the GRS 
and IAEA databases the main type is "Physical loss of electrical busbars". The events in 
these groups are registered mainly during the critical mode of operation.  
3.5 Type of equipment failed or concerned 
In this section the events in the analysed databases are sorted by the type of the failed 
equipment and mode of operation. 
The largest number of events in IRSN SAPIDE is registered for Switchyard/Breaker 
failures followed by the interconnections (lines and transformer) failures.  
The largest number of events in the GRS database, as shown on Figure 3, is observed 
for the busbar failures followed by the transformer failures. About half of the busbar 
failures and more than half of the transformer failures, as shown on Figure 3, are 
registered during cold shutdown. A large number of inverter failures is also identified in 
the GRS VERA database. 
 
Figure 3: LOOP events counts by "Type of equipment failed" (GRS VERA) 
 
The largest number of events in U.S. NRC LERs is registered for the primary or 
secondary power line followed by the failures in switchyard and transformers. The 
largest number of events IAEA IRS are registered for the switchyard/breaker failures 
followed by the transmission lines failures.  
The largest number of events, obtained from the analysis of all four databases, is 
registered for the switchyard failures followed by the interconnections failures (both lines 
and transformers). 
3.6 Direct cause  
The largest number of events in IRSN SAPIDE is plant related, registered during critical 
operation. The main direct cause for those plant related events is human failure (HF), 
with electrical, instrumentation and control (I&C) failures as second and third largest 
contributor. 
The largest number of events in the GRS VERA is observed for plant related LOOP events 
during critical operation. Comparable number of events is registered for cold shutdown 
operation. The dominant contributors in the plant related events are I&C failures. 
Figure 4 shows that the largest number of events in U.S. NRC LERs is identified for 
switchyard failures during critical operation. Figure 4 shows also that electrical failures 
are dominant contributor to the switchyard deficiency followed by the mechanical and 
I&C failures. The dominant contributor to the electric grid deficiency is environmental 
causes outside of the plant. 
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Figure 4: LOOP events counts and share of the specific direct causes in the sub-
categories of the "Direct causes" (U.S. NRC LERs) 
 
The largest number of events in IAEA IRS is registered for plant related events, with 
electrical failures as main cause.  
The classification by the "Direct causes" in this section shows that largest number of 
events is registered for the plant related events in the IRSN, GRS and IAEA databases 
and switchyard related events in the NRC database. The main cause of the events is 
electrical deficiency. Environment is registered as main contributor for the electrical grid 
deficiency in the IRSN and NRC databases. The electrical failures are dominant 
contributor to the electrical grid deficiency in the GRS and IAEA databases. 
3.7 Root cause  
The distribution of the sub-categories within the three main categories of the root 
causes, human performance – HF, equipment related – E and others, for events 
registered in the IRSN SAPIDE database is given in the Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of the "Root cause" sub-categories (IRSN SAPIDE) 
 
Figure 5 shows that the root cause of more than half of the events is related to the 
human performance, followed by equipment related events and other failures. 
Figure 5 shows also that the largest share of all registered LOOP events has root cause 
of human failure during tests, service and maintenance, followed by the human failures 
due to wrong procedures. The third largest share, not considering the unknown causes, 
is from equipment failures identified after the installation. 
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The largest number of events in GRS VERA is due to human performance with 
comparable number of events for equipment related events. The largest known cause is 
human failure during tests, service and maintenance followed by the human failure due 
to procedures and non-classified equipment failures.  
The largest number of events in the NRC LER is registered for human performance root 
cause followed by other causes and equipment related causes. The human performance 
events are registered both for critical and cold shutdown operation. 
The largest share in IAEA IRS LOOP events is from equipment failures after the 
installation followed by the human failures due to the procedures and human errors 
during test and maintenance.  
The dominant root cause for the LOOP events, based on the data presented in this 
section are human failures. The largest number of those failures is registered during 
critical operation. Within the human failures the largest sub-group are human errors 
during test, inspection and maintenance followed by the human failures due to the 
insufficient or wrong procedures.  
3.8 Consequences 
The largest number of LOOP events registered in IRSN SAPIDE resulted in reactor trip 
followed by the offsite line/external system connection switching.  
Figure 6 shows that the largest number of LOOP events in GRS VERA resulted in start of 
SBO EDG followed by internal line switching. Smaller number of reactor trips was 
expected considering the number of plants in shutdown mode in Germany in the 
analyzed period. 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of “Consequences” (GRS VERA) 
The largest number of events in NRC LERs database resulted in start of the EDG followed 
by reactor trip. This can be attributed to the successful reduction of turbine-generator 
output from full to house load power output resulting in non-trip LOOP. 
The largest number of events in IAEA IRS database resulted in reactor trips followed by 
starting and connection of the EDG.  
From the results presented in this section it can be concluded that the largest number of 
LOOP events resulted in reactor trip followed by the EDG start. 
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3.9 Event duration 
The largest number of events has duration of 2 minutes or more and the events are 
registered during critical operation. The major part of the events registered in GRS VERA 
has an undefined length but, considering their description, it can be assessed that they 
have duration longer than 2 minutes. 
4 Observations on the identified events 
Based on the review and analysis of the identified LOOP events the following actions may 
result in reduction of the number of LOOP events and minimize consequences on plant 
safety. 
- Maintenance activities on offsite power system should be coordinated with maintenance 
work on on-site power system, especially in conjunction with unavailability of the 
essential power system trains. External personnel conducting various works on-site 
should be adequately trained and informed considering accident prevention rules. 
Verified and clear procedures should be developed and implemented in the plant in order 
to avoid human failures resulting in LOOP and consequential SBO for the operation, 
maintenance and testing of electrical systems. Appropriate testing tools and methods 
should be implemented in order to avoid erroneous actuations of systems and 
consequential LOOP.  
- Adequate rate of the preventive maintenance is necessary to verify the availability and 
functionality of electrical equipment, especially older equipment with mechanical parts in 
order to avoid common-mode failures. The regular inspection of the power transformers 
phases surge arrestors and the ductwork joint seals is recommended in order to 
decrease the LOOP frequency. 
- Improved ageing-assessment program should be implemented for the electrical 
equipment in the nuclear power plant especially equipment that has transformer oil as 
isolation including for current and voltage transformers. The ageing assessment should 
consider load profile of the equipment and environmental conditions. Improved 
separation of non-safety electrical equipment can limit the damage of the fire in the 
switchyard. 
- The potential for common cause failures triggered by electronic components failures 
should be minimized with improved selection of installed parts, receiving feedback from 
the licensees about noticed anomalies, preparation and dispatching of adequate manuals 
and safe transport of the equipment. 
- Application of the adequate methods and tools for assessment of the cable conditions is 
recommended. The analysis should consider actual environmental conditions on whole 
route of the cables as well design and actual electrical loads that are powered by that 
cable. The voltage drop over the cable should be also considered in the analysis. 
- Maintenance work on electrical equipment should be minimized during the critical 
operation mode. Risk analysis of maintenance operations before their realization is 
recommended for important electrical equipment. 
- Adequate consideration of local weather and related consequential phenomena should 
be done at the design selection of the insulators. 
- A well-defined procedure to operate the unit during a fire incident must be established, 
as the electrical deficiency on power equipment can quickly result in a fire. 
- Appropriate separation and isolation should be implemented in the power system 
design especially when safety related system is powering non-safety related equipment. 
Modifications of the plant power system with connection of new equipment to the non-
safety power system of the plant, increasing independence and decreasing loads on 
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safety buses can improve power system availability. Potential for fire and explosions 
should be considered and minimized in the distribution system changes. 
- Clearly defined and programmatic (organizational and management) root cause 
analyses are essential for establishing fully effective corrective actions in order to 
eliminate scenarios of ineffective resolution of known technical problems. 
5 Conclusions 
The results of statistical and engineering analysis of the loss of offsite power and station 
blackout events in four reviewed databases are presented. The identified relevant events 
were classified into predefined categories considering: plant status, circumstances, type 
of event, type of equipment failed, direct and root cause, consequences of the event and 
event duration.  
An analysis of the identified events was performed and the LOOP frequency determined 
for four LOOP event categories: plant centered, switchyard centered, grid related and 
weather related during both critical and shutdown operation. 
For the IRSN database the mean frequency of 1.62E-1 events/ per reactor critical year 
(rcry) and 3.51E-1 events/ per reactor shutdown year (rsy) is assessed. For the GRS 
database a frequency of 3.69E-1 events/rcry and 1.08E+00 events/rsy are calculated. 
For both databases the dominant contributors are plant related events. The large 
frequency of LOOP events registered in the GRS database during shutdown can be 
attributed to the large number of NPPs in shutdown mode during the analysed period. 
For the NRC LER database the LOOP frequency of 3.61E-2 events/rcry and 9.03E-2 
events/rsy is determined and is comparable to the frequencies assessed in previous 
studies. The small frequencies of LOOP events identified in IAEA IRS can be attributed to 
the small number of events reported in this database limiting their relevance. 
In three databases (SAPIDE, VERA, IAEA-IRS) the largest numbers of events are 
registered for plant centered category, while switchyard centered events have the 
largest number in the NRC-LER database. The largest percentage of the events is 
registered during critical operation in all four databases. 
The "Partial loss of external power" type events are registered in the IRSN and NRC 
databases while the "Physical loss of electrical busbars" is the main type in the GRS and 
IAEA databases. 
The largest number of events is recorded for the switchyard failures followed by the 
interconnections failures (both lines and transformers). 
The electrical deficiency is found to be the main direct cause of the events with 
environment as main contributor for the electrical grid deficiency in the French and NRC 
databases. The electrical failures are dominant contributors to the electrical grid 
deficiency in the German and IAEA databases. 
The dominant root cause for the LOOP events is human failures with the human errors 
during test, inspection and maintenance as the largest contributing sub-group. 
The largest number of the LOOP events resulted in reactor trip followed by the start of 
the emergency diesel generators. Most of the identified LOOP events lasted for more 
than 2 minutes. 
Observations based on the analysis of the inedited events in order to decrease the 
frequency and consequences of LOOP events are enlisted. 
 
 
  
  
 
15
References  
IAEA, 2006. Fundamental Safety Principles, Safety Standards Series  
IAEA, 2009. Passive Safety Systems and Natural Circulation in Water Cooled Nuclear 
Power Plants, IAEA-TECDOC-1624. IAEA, Vienna. 
IAEA, 2010. IRS Guidelines – Joint IAEA/NEA International Reporting System for 
Operating Experience, Service Series 19. IAEA: Vienna, March 2010, Vienna. 
IAEA, 2012. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, Specific Safety Requirements No. 
SSR-2/1. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA, 2015a. Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, p. 79. 
IAEA, 2015b. Power Reactor Information System  
Kančev, D., Duchac, A., Zerger, B., Maqua, M., Wattrelos, D., 2014. Statistical analysis 
of events related to emergency diesel generators failures in the nuclear industry. Nuclear 
Engineering and Design 273, 321-331. 
NRC, U.S., 2005. Reevaluation of Station Blackout Risk at Nuclear Power Plants, 
NUREG/CR 6890, Washington. 
Volkanovski, A., Ballesteros, A., Kančev, D., 2015. Topical Study on Events Related to 
Loss of Offsite Power and Station Blackout at NPPs. EC JRC/IET, Petten, Netherlands. 
 
  
  
 
16
List of abbreviations and definitions 
AC:  Alternating Current 
EDG:  Emergency Diesel Generator 
I&C:  Instrumentation and Control 
IRS:  Incident Reporting System 
JRC:  Joint Research Centre 
LOOP:  Loss of Offsite Power 
NPP:  Nuclear Power Plant 
NRC:  Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
PWR:  Pressurized Water Reactor 
SBO:  Station Black Out 
  
 
17
List of figures 
Figure 1: LOOP events distribution by category "Plant status" (U.S. NRC LERs) ............. 8 
Figure 2: LOOP events counts by "Circumstances" (IRSN SAPIDE) ............................... 9 
Figure 3: LOOP events counts by "Type of equipment failed" (GRS VERA) .................. 10 
Figure 4: LOOP events counts and share of the specific direct causes in the sub-
categories of the "Direct causes" (U.S. NRC LERs) ................................................... 11 
Figure 5: Distribution of the "Root cause" sub-categories (IRSN SAPIDE) ................... 11 
Figure 6: Distribution of “Consequences” (GRS VERA) .............................................. 12 
 
  
  
 
18
List of tables  
Table 1: Number of selected events for different plant status and database .................. 6 
Table 2: Plant-level LOOP frequencies assessed from IRSN database ........................... 7 
Table 3: Plant-level LOOP frequencies assessed from GRS database ............................ 7 
Table 4: Plant-level LOOP frequencies assessed from US NRC database ....................... 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
How to obtain EU publications 
 
Our publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), 
where you can place an order with the sales agent of your choice. 
 
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. 
You can obtain their contact details by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758. 
 
 
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union 
Free phone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed. 
 
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. 
It can be accessed through the Europa server http://europa.eu 
  
 
2
 
 
JRC Mission 
 
As the Commission’s  
in-house science service,  
the Joint Research Centre’s  
mission is to provide EU  
policies with independent,  
evidence-based scientific  
and technical support  
throughout the whole  
policy cycle. 
 
Working in close  
cooperation with policy  
Directorates-General,  
the JRC addresses key  
societal challenges while  
stimulating innovation  
through developing  
new methods, tools  
and standards, and sharing  
its know-how with  
the Member States,  
the scientific community  
and international partners. 
 
Serving society  
Stimulating innovation  
Supporting legislation 
 
doi:10.2790/70161 
ISBN 978-92-79-55015-7 
L
D
-N
A
-2
7
7
4
2
-E
N
-N
 
